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i. introduction
At Oxford, Salmond on Torts had been my favorite textbook (Salmond 1953). It was a
conventional, lucid, expository work. Shortly after I had graduated in 1955, a solicitor
specializing in personal injuries told me to forget what I had learned in the books
because nearly all of his cases were settled out of court with an insurance company or
the Motor Insurers’ Bureau involved. Anyway, he said, the system needed drastic
reform. I suffered culture shock. So I began to wonder: how could one understand
the law relating to personal injuries if one knows nothing about insurance, settle-
ment, the damages lottery, and alternatives to the common law action for negli-
gence?1 I felt misled, let down, even betrayed by Salmond and my teachers. This is a
common complaint by students in most modern legal systems. Of course, I was
naı¨ve, for no one in Oxford had claimed that what they were offering was in any way
realistic. Brian Leiter cites a colleague as saying: “Anyone teaching constitutional
law who discusses only the doctrine is guilty of educational malpractice” (Leiter
2003, citing Powe 2001). That was how I felt about Torts. But the context in England
was different. When I complained, I was met with standard, complacent answers:
* More detailed exploration of nearly all of the ideas presented here can be found in the following works:
William Twining, The Great Juristic Bazaar (2002) (hereafter GJB) esp. chapters 4, 5, and 6;
Globalisation and Legal Theory (2000–2001) (hereafter GLT) especially chapters 2, 5–8; General
Jurisprudence (2009) (hereafter GJP) esp. chapters 1, 6–7, 8, 10, and 11; Rethinking Evidence, 2nd
edition, (2006) (hereafter RE); Globalisation and Legal Scholarship (2011) (hereafter GLS); and Karl
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd edition (with Afterword, 2012) (hereafter, KLRM, and
Afterword.).
I am grateful for helpful comments by the editors, David Restrepo Amariles, Hanoch Dagan,
Maksymilian Del Mar, Sioneaidh Douglas-Scott, Brian Tamanaha, and especially Andrew Halpin.
This is an attempt to restate and update a position on what is involved in being “realistic” about law.
These theses are advanced in a deliberately condensed form. The endnotes provide signposts in various
directions. As noted, for more details, I refer the reader to the works referred to in the paragraph above.
1 Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (1970) can be held out as a “realistic” counterpoint to
Salmond on Torts. See also Atiyah (1997). There is room for genuine disagreement about whether
Atiyah’s work undermines, rivals, or merely complements works like Salmond. By the 16th edition
(1973), the editor of Salmond had added a seven-page section on “The Influence of Insurance.”
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“We do not claim that we are preparing you for practice.”
“You will learn about suchmatters when you study procedure.” (This was untrue;
the bar exams were just as doctrinal.)
“Be realistic, you need to mug up Salmond to pass both degree and professional
examinations.”
“Such pedestrian matters are just common sense.”
And, more convincingly:
“Studying the law in action presupposes that you have a clear idea about what is in
action. So your practitioner friend was wrong, you need to study the books before
getting involved in the action.”
The purpose of this paper is to restate some basic points about Legal R/realism as an
aspect of Jurisprudence.2 Most of the general theses should be familiar and, I hope,
acceptable to most sociolegal scholars, but a few points may appear to be provocative.
Classical American Legal Realism (ALR) reacted against an ill-defined “form-
alism” in academic law in the period before World War II. The New Legal
Realism (NLR), still in reaction to the dominance of doctrinal approaches, has
developed in a quite different intellectual and ideological context in an era in
which new technology, bureaucratic audit, evidence-based practice, evidence-
based policy, and “globalization” are among matters in the foreground of aca-
demic concerns. ALR has been treated as an American school or movement in
Jurisprudence, even though its main concerns were with quite particularistic
matters to do with legal education and scholarship and law reform. The New
Legal Realism (NLR), open-ended and diverse, has also been mainly concerned
with teaching and research in the American law schools, and only peripherally
with its relationship to legal theory.
My standpoint is that of a British – maybe mid-Atlantic – jurist of realist persuasion
concerned about the health of our discipline as a collective transnational enterprise
and of jurisprudence as its theoretical part in a period of immense challenges and rapid
change. This paper argues that if “realism” is to flourish it needs to advance one strong,
but limited, theoretical claim that challenges doctrine-centered legal theory: namely,
that empirical dimensions of law and justice3 are a necessary part of the enterprise of
2 This paper focuses on jurisprudence, as the theoretical part of our discipline, as carried out mainly by
law teachers and judges associated with British and U.S. law schools, such as Hart, Fuller, Dworkin,
Raz, Finnis, MacCormick, and Posner. For reasons of space, it does not deal directly with social theory
and theoretical dimensions of the sociology of law, but much of the argument applies to them. Of
course, there are no clear boundaries between jurisprudence and social theory, and some individuals,
such as Roger Cotterrell and Philip Selznick, have contributed to both.
3 The term echoes Julius Stone, who also insisted on the interdependence of analytical, empirical, and
normative concerns (Stone 1956). See generally GJB, ch.8. Anyone who agrees that understanding law
requires knowledge of what law is like in “the real world” is an empiricist in the broad sense used here.
“Empirical” here includes, but is broader than, the social sciences, as it extends to practical experience,
legal history, and scholarly work such as Brian Simpson’s contextual studies of leading cases (Kritsiotis
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understanding law.4 Any theory of law or jurisprudential perspective that denies this
proposition, implicitly or explicitly, is damaging to the health of the discipline of law,
as it is practiced in the West and more widely, not just in the United States.5 Most of
what I shall call doctrinal legal theory rejects or ignores that claim.6
ii. ten theses
A. The Discipline of Law and the Functions of Jurisprudence
1. The primary mission of a scholarly discipline should be advancing and dis-
seminating theoretical and practical knowledge and understanding about the
subject-matters of that discipline.7 The primary mission of the discipline of law
should be the advancement and dissemination of theoretical and practical
knowledge (know-what, know-why, know-how) and understanding about the
subject-matters of that discipline.
2. Jurisprudence, broadly interpreted, is the theoretical part of the discipline of
law. A theoretical question is one posed at a relatively high level of abstraction.
and McCrudden 2012; Simpson 1984, 1995.) “Empiricism” is a contested concept in philosophy:
“There are almost as many empiricisms as there are empiricists, but what these views or approaches
have in common is an emphasis on the importance of experience in the formation of concepts and to
the acquisition of knowledge. The foil to empiricism is rationalism, which emphasizes instead the
importance of thought and knowledge of material that is in some sense independent of experience”
(Lipton, 2001) (a useful brief history of the philosophical debates). Of course, in law, and especially in
respect of legal education and training, much knowledge and understanding of the law in action,
especially lawyers’ action, is obtained by experience and observation in the workplace. On the views of
English legal practitioners on what is best learned in the classroom and what in the workplace, see
“Legal Education and Training Review Report” (2013) http://letr.org.uk/the-report.
4 The term “understanding law” is sometimes used to refer to understanding the concept or nature or
even “essence” of law. Here it is used, as in introductory books and courses with that title, to refer to all
of the subject-matters of the discipline as it is institutionalized at a given time or place.
5 The activity of legal theorizing, as used here, includes, but is much wider than, enquiries into the
nature or essence of law, or analysis of conceptions of law. It includes any general enquiries directed to
understanding legal phenomena, both law as ideas and law as social facts.
6 Why would any serious legal scholar or theorist disclaim any concern with being realistic about law?
Brian Leiter states that he finds it hard to fathom that anyone disputes the truth of legal realism. I
sympathize with Leiter’s thesis about (moderate) naturalism (Leiter 2007) and with his colleague
Powe’s sentiment (see quote p.121) but neither of these are part of my argument here (see notes 23 and
46 below). The answer to that puzzle is outside the scope of this paper. The fact is that most
mainstream legal philosophers and jurists appear to dispute the truth of legal realism as interpreted
here – the main examples cited in the text are Hart, Dworkin, Raz. Of course, some leading jurists,
such as Dworkin, may have misguidedly thought that they were being “realistic.”
7 The Full Complement of Riches (British Academy 2004). “Riches” and “wealth” are explicitly interpreted
very broadly as extending beyond economic wealth (see GJP, Preface). This chapter is written in much
the same spirit as Martha Nussbaum’s Not for Profit (2010) and recent efforts to make the case for the
value to society of the social sciences and the humanities (cf. American Academy of Arts and Sciences
(2013)).
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Besides legal philosophy (the most abstract part), it encompasses many inter-
related questions at varying levels of abstraction.8
The activity of theorizing about law has many overlapping functions.9 In the
present context, one important function is to critically evaluate and guide the
practices and theory of legal scholarship and legal education – that is, to monitor
the health of the discipline as a whole and its constituent and shifting subdisci-
plines.10 This role is of central relevance here because an important connecting
thread between different historical forms of R/realism has been a reaction against
tendencies to focus narrowly or even exclusively on doctrine in respect of scholar-
ship, legal education, and legal theory and to criticize these tendencies as being
“unrealistic.”11
3. A distinction between law as ideas and law as social facts is significant in the
present context.
This distinction identifies two important historical strands in Western traditions of
academic law regarding the practices of legal scholarship and legal theory. They
have often been perceived and presented as rival or warring perspectives and
approaches. One of the main concerns of a realist perspective, as interpreted here,
is to challenge this distinction on the ground that understanding law needs to
combine conceptual, doctrinal, normative, and empirical perspectives in different
ways at different levels (GJP 30–31, 118–121).12
8 An example of different levels of enquiry, relevant in the present context, is: dispute processing in
general; dispute processing in state law, in litigation; dispute settlement by court; adjudication in
general; adjudication on questions of law, on questions of law in hard cases, in common law systems, in
the United States, in American state appellate courts, in a particular court at a particular time, in a
single opinion in one case; and so on, up and down several ladders of abstraction (GJP, 21–22, 258). For
a further example, on reasoning, see note 51 below.
9 These include critical intellectual history; synthesis; conceptual analysis; construction of normative
theories and standards; constructing, refining, and testing empirical hypotheses about legal phenom-
ena; developing working theories for participants; and the critical identification, analysis, and assess-
ment of important presuppositions and assumptions underlying legal discourse generally and
particular phases of it (GJP, ch.1–8, esp. 1.3). All of these can be relevant to monitoring the health of
our discipline.
10 For example, in recent years there have been significant movements to “rethink” some subdisciplines,
including international law, comparative law, and empirical legal studies. One role of legal theory is to
assist critically in such internal critiques (GLS, 35–38). A recent inspection of the library catalogue of
the University of Miami Law School revealed nearly 100 relatively recent books with “Rethinking” in
the title. My Rethinking Evidence can be interpreted as a case-study of what is involved in rethinking a
sub-discipline in a broader fashion from a realist or contextual perspective (RE, 366–368).
11 On some different targets of charges of “unrealism,” see Schauer (2012, xv–xvii).
12 In discussing the work of Neil MacCormick (2007) in relation to the concept of a legal system, Julie
Dickson uses a similar distinction and agrees with MacCormick that we need both and that they are
closely inter-related (Dickson 2012, 145–159). In this chapter, following MacCormick, the term “legal
phenomena” encompasses both law as ideas (doctrine) and law as social facts. Both are institutional
facts.
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Familiar contrasts between the law in books and the law in action13 and between
law as rules and law as institutions, processes, and practices echo the distinction
between law as ideas and law as social facts rather imprecisely. One version that is
particularly interesting is Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between the doctrinal con-
cept of law and the sociological concept of law.14 In a rash statement in a polemical
article, he went so far as to say: “The sociological question has neither much
practical nor much philosophical interest. The doctrinal question, on the contrary,
is a question both of enormous practical and considerable philosophical interest”
(Dworkin 2006a, 97).
Later Dworkin modified his position by restricting his denial of “philosophical
interest” to abstract conceptual enquiries into the “essential” nature of law (Dworkin
2006b, 4, cf. formulations at 3, 227–228).15He grudgingly acknowledges the existence
of legal sociology and legal anthropology, but still treats such empirical legal
studies16 as being of not much practical interest and as marginal and subordinate
to the ideas of jurisprudence and law as moral enterprises (Dworkin 2006b, 3–5).17
13 On different meanings of “law in action” see note 32 below. On “the gap problem,” see GJP (318–320)
and Nelken (1981).
14 He also expresses this in terms of “the doctrinal question” and “the sociological question” (as if there is
only one central question in legal philosophy, let alone jurisprudence) (Dworkin 2006b, 4–5, 227–232).
Dworkin’s last major work was entitled Justice for Hedgehogs (2011). It sets out powerfully his mature
theory of private and public morality. I consider it a major contribution to ethics, but less persuasive in
respect of jurisprudence just because it downplays and ignores the empirical dimensions of under-
standing law. It is strong on aspiration, but weak on reality. In my view this is unfortunate and
unnecessary. The moral dimensions are an important aspect of understanding legal phenomena,
but the discipline of law is not solely or mainly a moral enterprise in Dworkin’s sense. On the
hedgehog/fox metaphor, see note 34 below.
15 See further GJP (25–30), Schauer (2009) and Halpin (2006, 67). Justice in Robes (Dworkin 2006b, ch.
6) is a powerful attack on the kind of analytical legal philosophy that claims to be “an independent, self-
contained subject and profession.”
16 In this context the term “empirical legal studies” is used broadly to cover both quantitative and
qualitative studies, but also information based on experience, such as evidence given by experienced
experts and practitioners and what Karl Llewellyn called “horse sense.” See further GJP (ch. 8).
17 It is difficult to believe that Dworkin really intended to suggest that there are no interesting philoso-
phical questions underpinning empirical legal studies or other nondoctrinal studies of the kind listed
in notes 1–3 above. A charitable interpretation is that other philosophical issues were not directly
interesting to him personally or relevant to his (narrow) question about the relationship between legal
and moral propositions (see above note 14). John Gardner (2012, 296–297 n) criticizes me for veering
“dangerously close to a Dworkinian diktat about what is interesting.” Of course, Gardner as an
individual is free to follow his own intellectual interests, but this does not address concerns about
the health of the discipline of law and of legal theory as a collective enterprise and about the role of
theory in monitoring that health, especially where communication between different kinds of inquiry
could be substantially improved. On this point, see Nicola Lacey’s Jurisprudence Lecture,
“Institutionalising Responsibility” (Lacey 2013) (showing how concepts like responsibility and legality
have to be understood in their historical and institutional contexts). In his writings on constitutional
and policy issues concerning subjects such as abortion, euthanasia, and medicare (e.g., Dworkin 1994
and his many brilliant essays in the New York Review of Books), Dworkin treats empirical data as
sometimes relevant, but not to basic principles of morality (e.g., 2011, 418–419). On Dworkin as a
possible rule-skeptic, see below note 56.
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Dworkin’s original statement and his partial retraction are revealing for both
positive and negative reasons:
First, Dworkin’s conception of “doctrine” usefully includes principles, concepts,
and distinctions in addition to rules. This sets up a more robust version of the
tradition against which realism has reacted than “law is rules” conceptions and
labels such as formalism, legal dogmatics, blackletter law, the expository orthodoxy,
and law in books. It allows for forms of exposition that are rigorous and sophisti-
cated.18 The basic realist objection is against the dominance of or an exclusive
emphasis on doctrinal studies, not on doctrinal studies as such.
Second, this distinction is useful as a label indicating two distinctive traditions
within Western academic law, in which the doctrinal tradition has been paramount
throughout most of history both in respect of legal scholarship and legal theory.
Competing concepts or traditions of legal positivism and natural law are treated as
falling within the doctrinal concept. Most canonical jurists in the Western tradition
are doctrinal theorists, mainly focused on municipal (state) law.19
Dworkin provides a useful reference point because he stakes out a clear position
that is both revealing and open to attack on several other fronts:
First, Dworkin treats the distinction between doctrine and “sociology” as crucial,
because they are different forms of enquiry that are conceptually separate. One of
the main concerns of a realist perspective, as interpreted here, is to challenge this
distinction on the ground that understanding law and legal phenomena combines
conceptual, doctrinal, normative, and empirical perspectives in different ways at
different levels and in different contexts. In this context “doctrine” and “empirical
legal studies” are at best very rough labels for broad fields with no clear boundaries.
Second, Dworkin’s use of “sociological” (i) is very loose if it is intended to refer to
the social sciences generally;20 (ii) is narrow if it implies that the only (significant)
enquiries in law that are not doctrinal are “sociological”;21 (iii) seemingly restricts
legal philosophy to a single main question about the doctrinal concept of law:
18 Compare AndrewHalpin’s “richer notion” of legal doctrine, including not only rule-formulations, but
also principles, differentiated conceptions of interpretive roles, and informed conceptions of the
nature of legal materials, all of which are normally “beneath the surface” (Halpin 2004, ch. 1).
19 Some leadingmembers of the critical studies movement focused emphatically on legal doctrine, but it
would be misleading to categorize them as “doctrinal theorists.”
20 It is also crudely emotive: in Oxford “sociological” has often been used as a term of disparagement.
21 This broad interpretation of Dworkin’s conception of “sociology of law” seemingly excludes non-
doctrinal studies that are not social scientific. For example, on the academic side, study of inferential
reasoning from evidence about questions of fact and other reasonings in legal contexts; probabilities
and proof; historical and historiographical enquiries (other than those that are purely doctrinal); the
study of legal traditions (mainly law as ideas); standpoint analysis; narrative analysis; artificial intelli-
gence; computer applications; theoretical questions about describing, comparing, and generalizing
about legal phenomena – bothmicro- andmacro-comparative legal studies; the implications for law of
neuroscience and artificial intelligence, and so on. It is a strange view of our discipline if all of these
enquiries fall outside it. It also seemingly excludes what is learned by practical experience or close
observation of actual practices. On the views of practitioners about what is best learned in the
workplace rather than the classroom (and semble by fieldwork), see the important English Legal
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namely, “whether and when morality figures in the truth conditions of law”
(Dworkin 2006b, 4–5). In the same paragraph he uses a slightly different formula-
tion, which makes clear that it is confined to doctrine: “The main question is
whether and how morality is relevant to deciding which propositions of law are
true, not how we label whatever moral principles we do take to be relevant”
(Dworkin 2006b, 5). This is a much narrower conception of legal philosophy, let
alone jurisprudence, than is adopted here.
Third, Dworkin’s formulations are an interesting example of the gravitational pull
of doctrinal studies for legal theorists. The great majority of Western jurists have
focused on questions about the identification, nature, normativity, legitimacy,
justice, and injustice of law considered as legal doctrine. Similarly, common law
jurists have been lured to focus on decisions and reasoning about questions of law in
appellate courts as somehow central to understanding legal phenomena.22 Some
American Realists are regularly perceived to have succumbed to this strong gravita-
tional pull.23
Education and Training Review Report (England and Wales) (2013, esp. ch. 2). Experience of legal
practice at first or second hand is one of the most important sources of realistic understanding of the
law in action. Of course, it is important to bear in mind that lawyers’ action is only one aspect law in
action generally. On “law in action” as a concept, see below note 32.
22 The obsession with the upper-level courts and in particular the U.S. Supreme Court is one aspect of
American exceptionalism. For most non-American jurists, legislation, regulation, enforcement,
impact, and attitudes to law etc. are as important an aspect of understanding law as higher-level
adjudication. On overconcentration on contested trials, contested jury trials, and appellate courts, and
the significance of a total process model of litigation, see RE, 169, 220–221, 249–252, and 314. I have
some sympathy with the idea that the point of application is a crucial point in the interpretation of
doctrine, so that particular decisions are in some sense “central” (Twining andMiers 2010, 131–132, 145–
147), but that is different from exaggerating the importance of judges and appellate cases in most legal
systems.
23 For example, Brian Leiter treats the proposition that “judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts”
as the Core Thesis of classical ALR (Leiter 2007, 21, cf. 23–4). This proposition is confined to decisions
on questions of law by American, mainly appellate, judges at a particular period. If a contemporary
realist were to take Leiter’s Core Thesis seriously other than as a partial historical claim about ALR, she
would have to rephrase it as a hypothesis to be tested, or as an open question (e.g., what factors have
influenced common law/American/federal judges [when] on questions of law?”) because the Core
Thesis is an empirical generalization or hypothesis about (American?) (appellate?) judges at some
unspecified times in the past. I find Leiter’s naturalist reconstruction of ALR to be interesting, though
unduly narrow (for a brief discussion, see Afterword 440–441; see further Halpin 2009, 147–153).
Leiter, in concentrating on adjudication on questions of law, states that ALR interest in empirical
legal studies was “unrepresentative” (citing The Cheyenne Way and Moore’s studies). This excludes
Frank (1949) on fact-finding; it also overlooks Llewellyn on rules (2011), as well as his idea of “horse
sense” (expertise based on experience), and his much-criticized “barefoot empiricism” in respect of
divorce, commercial practice, and law reform. More importantly, this ignores empirical research at
Johns Hopkins and Yale notably by Cook, Yntema, Oliphant, Douglas, Moore, and Callaghan, and
Clark and Corstvet, at least some of whom are included in nearly all lists of “Realists” (Schlegel 1995).
See also critiques of the Restatement project (a good survey of the criticisms is Merryman 1954). This is
not the place to go into further detail about interpretations of ALR (but see GJB, ch. 5 and 6 and
Afterword).
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Fourth, Dworkin’s bizarre and unnecessary dismissal of the practical value and
theoretical interest of empirical legal studies hardly deserves a response.24 But it
illustrates the chasm between sociolegal theorizing (however identified) and the
views of those contemporary jurists and legal scholars who are still under the
gravitational pull of “the doctrinal concept.” (On Raz’s more sympathetic treatment
of empirical legal studies and legal history see below (pages 139–140).
B. R/realism
4. Concern to be “realistic” about the law in action has never been an American
exclusive. It is important to distinguish clearly between American Legal
Realism (ALR) as an historical phenomenon and more widespread concerns
about being “realistic” about law.
As Brian Tamanaha reminds us (2013), there is a long tradition in the West at both
theoretical and practical levels which shares such concerns.25 Hence we need a
distinction between “Legal Realism” as a name for a particular movement among
American academic lawyers at a particular time and “legal realism” as a much more
general approach and focus of concern (GJB, 102–105).
5. Discussion of legal realism in respect of contemporary issues needs to
break free from historical debates about interpretations of ALR and its
significance.26
Macaulay, Mertz, and others have argued that, while the history of ALR is interest-
ing, dwelling on the past is likely to have a constraining effect on the New Legal
24 On the question: Was Dworkin’s denial serious? See above notes 17 and 21.
25 Tamanaha (2013) argues that what he calls “the third pillar” of jurisprudence has found theoretical
expression in various ways through Montesquieu, Ehrlich, the Historical School, and Ihering, as well
as through Pound and American Legal Realism. Such lists can be idiosyncratic: my list would also
include Machiavelli, Santi Romano, Hume, Adam Smith, and Julius Stone, who was influenced by
Pound. Like Tamanaha, Hanoch Dagan argues for a distinctive realist synthesizing theory of law
reconstructed from charitable interpretations of some classic texts (Dagan 2013a and 2013b). Dagan’s
theory of law is very interesting, but my argument is that any general theory of law should accom-
modate “realistic perspectives,” as interpreted here, and that jurists of many different persuasions
should accept the thesis that general legal theories or approaches that deny this proposition are
seriously defective. On Dagan, see further below note 41.
26 I make one exception here. I have not moved far enough out of the shadow of Karl Llewellyn to disclaim
his influence. For example, several of his precepts underpin my argument: “Technique without ideals is
amenace; ideals without techniques are amess” (Llewellyn 1952, 23); “Knowledge . . . does not have to be
scientific, in order to be useful and important” (discussed in KLRM, 190–193); “Doctrine brittle and neat
is the tool of tenderminds in pursuit of policy that can be embraced without using one’s intellect” (KNL,
lecture in “Law in our Society,” 1958); “[Realism] applies to anything” (Llewellyn 1960, 509–510); “If
Jurisprudence of necessity includes a study of ideals in law, then realism is not [co-extensive with]
jurisprudence. If, as I think, jurisprudence contains [seven] sub-disciplines, then realism deals with two
of them: craft techniques and descriptive sociology” (Llewellyn 1942–1943, 5, cited KLRM, 575). I agree
with the spirit, but not necessarily the exact formulations, of all of these dicta.
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Realism (NLR) (Mertz 2016). There may be some actual continuities and some
unfinished agenda,27 as well as some false claims to ancestry (de Been 2008).
However, there are several good reasons for contemporary jurists to distance them-
selves from these earlier debates: (a) the intellectual climate has changed and
developed; (b) most classic legal realist texts have been superseded;28 (c) the local
history of ALR is not directly relevant to developing realistic approaches across
national boundaries29 – “realist” approaches in other countries and traditions have
different histories; (d) a misleading mythology has grown up around ALR (I have
argued elsewhere that most generalizations about ALR are trivial or false, or both,
and they tend to obscure the most interesting contributions in specific texts by
individual Realists (GJB, ch.5));30 (e) in teaching jurisprudence, concentration on
classic ALR texts can distort the contemporary significance of realism.31 In short,
discussions of “realism” today need to be de-parochialised and updated.
6. Labels and concepts. Labels such as “Realism,” “realism,” “sociology of law,”
“Law in/and Society,” “law in context” should not be expected to do much work
as concepts, especially not as conceptions of law. They are best treated as rough
and overlapping designations of fields of enquiry or approaches. However,
“realism” has an important role to play in jurisprudence as a hedgehog concept.
27 On Llewellyn’s unfinished agenda (see GJB, ch. 6 and Afterword, 438–443). On Underhill Moore, see
below, 138.
28 KLRM, ch. 15 discusses ALR texts that were still worth reading in 1973. Today, one can treat some of
these as being mainly of historical interest. Some realist texts survive because they are soft targets, even
if they were retracted or modified. This includes some statements in Frank’s Law and the Modern
Mind (1930) (generally ignoringCourts on Trial (1949)) and Llewellyn’s famous two rash statements in
The Bramble Bush (1930), which continued to be used as a target after he had retracted it in 1951, most
influentially by Hart (1961, ch. 6). Hart later discreetly retracted in “The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream” (Hart 1983, 128), but Hart’s retraction has also been ignored by some later commentators.
29 On implications of transnationalization for realist approaches, see my Thesis 10. From its inception
NLR has included transnationalization as one of its central concerns (e.g., Garth 2006; Merry 2006;
Suchman and Mertz 2010).
30 In particular, the idea that ALR was exclusively concerned with adjudication on contested or hard
questions of law deserves to be seen as both in respect of ALR, but more importantly as an account of
adjudication in general rather than of rarified appellate adjudication. It suggests a tendency within
ALR and among commentators also to succumb to the gravitational pull of the doctrinal concept of
law, the very tradition that realists were reacting against. At least Llewellyn acknowledged in The
Bramble Bush that by focusing on appellate cases he was capitulating to “the threat of the available”
(Llewellyn 1930, 102–104). Reasoning about questions of law and questions of fact (a problematic
distinction) and other practical reasonings are, of course, involved at many stages of litigation (not just
in courts) and in other legal practice contexts. See below note 51.
31 There is an abundant literature to choose from. Some papers in this book might serve the purpose.
Some chapters of Hanoch Dagan’s challenging book Reconstructing American Legal Realism and
Rethinking Private Law Theory (2013) or one of his shorter essays, e.g., “Law as an Academic
Discipline” (forthcoming) would serve to bridge the gap between classical ALR and contemporary
concerns. However, in my view the key question for students should be: what is involved in being
realistic about law today? In considering possible answers, teachers need to break free from ALR texts.
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In 1929–1930, the label “Realism” probably served its purpose as a contrast to an
ill-defined “formalism.” It was rhetorically effective: punchy, macho, and open-
ended: RealMen realistically depicting Real Law in the RealWorld (i.e., the United
States). Perhaps fortunately, perhaps not, commentators have not generally taken
“R/realism” as a concept very seriously in this context. On the whole, they have
related it to vague, commonsense understandings of “the law in action” (another
macho term)32 or legal practice or legal practices. Like jesting Pilate they have not
stayed for an answer. But if we did try to tease out a core meaning, we would be
entering a philosophical33 and aesthetic morass. For example, in art history “rea-
lism” has variously been interpreted to refer to at least ten different ideas (Osborne
1970). It might possibly be fruitful to locate some particular ALR texts as analogous to
one or other of these, but it is unlikely to be helpful to interpret ALR in general in
terms of such analogies. At most, it would further underline the diversity of ALR.
However, realism as interpreted here has a contribution to make to jurisprudence,
not as a theory of or about law, nor as a rounded philosophy of law, nor as a rival or
subverter of analytic, idealist, or doctrinal approaches, but rather as one integral part
of understanding law. In this view, it is best treated as a hedgehog concept; that is, it
stands for one Big Idea – the importance of the empirical dimensions of law and
justice as part of understanding law.34 Once that proposition is accepted, the gates
open to all of the foxy diversity, controversy, differing traditions, and dilemmas and
problems within empirical legal studies.35
32 The term “law in action” is useful as a broad term designating a focus on empirical aspects of law as
social fact. But its vagueness is revealing. Leaving aside the indeterminacy of “law” in this context
(what is in action?), what does action encompass? Surely it need not be limited just to behavior (e.g.,
Black 1976, 1995) or attitudes, but also beliefs, values, techniques, skills, knowledge and opinion about
law, unintended consequences, impact, etc. Can there be action and agency withoutmeaning? Are not
rules important sources of meaning? Whose action? Surely not only appellate judges: that would be
clearly unrealistic both about the tasks of judging and about other law-related actors, subjects, and
victims: e.g., law-makers, law interpreters, appliers, expositors, enforcers, users, avoiders, evaders,
plaintiffs, claimants, deviants, regulators, inspectors, regulators, and observers – individuals, legal
persons, and collectivities (see also above note 30). On the much-debated distinction between “the
gap” between law in books and law in action, see GJP, 318–320; Nelken, 981). One aim of realist and
contextual approaches has been to get more of the action into the books. This has been one of themain
aspirations of the Law in Context series since 1970.
33 “Real” as opposed to what? Artificial (posited?), fake, false, deluded, unreal, imaginary, nominalistic,
aspirational, ideal, speculative? Does it encompass virtual reality, magic realism, multiple realities,
irrealism? Does commitment to a realistic perspective imply a particular epistemology, such as Susan
Haack’s “innocent realism”? (Haack 1998; GJB, ch. 9). Can a Rortyan post-modernist also be a
“realist”? (GJB, 293–295; Rorty 1991). Did Dworkin think that he was being realistic? And so on. My
own epistemology is close to Haack’s, but the claim that realism about the law in action is important or
necessary as part of understanding legal phenomena does not necessarily imply a particular epistemol-
ogy, even for non-cognitivists. Rather it is mainly a matter of focus.
34 “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” The allusion refers to a
distinction drawn by Archilocus, and popularized by Isaiah Berlin (1953). Ronald Dworkin’s last
major work was entitled Justice for Hedgehogs (2011); see above note 14. His hedgehog idea concerns
the unity of value, the central tenet in his moral theory.
35 On some standard dichotomies and tensions within the social sciences see GJP, 258–262.
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Berlin’s (1953) metaphor of the hedgehog and the fox is easily overused.36 In
respect of individual thinkers, it can at best indicate tendencies between two poles or
ideal types representing universality and particularity, which are relative matters,
with most thinkers and theories moving up and downmultiple ladders of abstraction
with differences of emphasis. Realism as a hedgehog concept represents one key
aspect of an approach that in practice tends towards the particularistic. It also reflects
recent debates about Realism and Idealism: how far can and should philosophy,
especially moral philosophy, engage with “real life” problems?37
7. New Legal Realism (NLR) is presented by its leaders as primarily an activist
movement concerned to integrate empirical legal studies in concrete ways into
academic legal practice, especially law teaching and legal scholarship. It is out
to change what academic lawyers do and to foster empirical legal approaches
rather than make any sustained contribution to jurisprudence.
To an outsider “the New Legal Realism” seems to be a lively, fast-moving, and
stimulating movement. It is admirably open-ended and, for that reason, difficult to
characterize or generalize about. One hopes that it will not be bedeviled by futile
debates about its scope andmeaning. For the immediate purpose, it will suffice to set
up an ideal type of statements and claims about the movement, based on statements
by Mertz (especially, 2016); Macaulay and Mertz (2013); Macaulay (2005); and
Suchman and Mertz (2010).
What kind of “ism” is NLR? It is fairly clear what it is not: (i) it is not a theory of or
about law, nor does it assume a particular conception of law; (ii) it is not a
philosophy of law; (iii) it is not an alternative or rival to other perspectives, such as
natural law or moderate versions of positivism;38 (iv) it does not give a precise or
specific meaning to the term “R/realism”; (v) its orientation is empiricist in a broad
sense, but it is open-ended about perspectives, methods, and focuses of attention. In
particular, it is not confined to the study of adjudication (in a broad or narrow sense),
and it encourages “bottom up” (ground-level) standpoints, among others; (vi) it is
not merely a continuation of classical American Legal Realism;39 (vii) it is not
36 The hedgehog/fox distinction has been used less appropriately by Brian Simpson in characterizing
himself as a fox and Herbert Hart as a hedgehog. Neither characterization works well (see Kritiosis and
McCrudden 2012, passim).
37 On Amartya Sen as realist, see below note 53.
38 There may be a tendency for realist work to assume some positivist conception of law, in the sense of
distinguishing law as it is and law as it ought to be in some contexts, in my view often for good reason
(GJB, 107–111; cf. Leiter 2007, 60. See further below note 42 and accompanying text). But that is not a
necessary condition for being “realistic.” Insofar as this paper argues for the integration of conceptual,
normative, and realist perspectives, it assumes that moderate forms of conceptual analysis (but not
replacement naturalism) and of normative or ideal theory are reconcilable with moderate realism.
Dagan (2013b) makes the case that his reconstruction of ALR is incompatible with positivism. This is a
debate for another occasion.
39 Insofar as it has intellectual forebears, it follows on from the aspirations of the “scientific wing” of ALR
and the Law and SocietyMovement, but wishes to break free from the narrowing constraints of debates
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puristic about scientific rigor, but echoes Llewellyn’s dictum that “knowledge does
not have to be scientific, in order to be useful and important” (Llewellyn 1941, 22;
KLRM 188–193). It recognizes the constraints on feasibility and sustainability of
rigorous empirical research.
It is less easy to generalize about NLR – that is one of its strengths. Onemay say: (i) it
is stronglymulti-disciplinary and interdisciplinary and sensitive to the difficulties of this
kind of scholarship and theorizing; (ii) its research agenda is open-ended, but so far it
has been mainly concerned with legal phenomena in the United States; (iii) the top
priority of its educational agenda to date is to stimulate and facilitate the translation and
integration of empirical research findings into mainstream courses in American law
schools; (iv) one of its main concerns is how to translate and use findings of empirical
research, especially social scientific research, into the academic language and culture
of academic law; (v) it is activist at a practical level both in providing training in
methodology and sensitizing mainstream academic lawyers to the relevance of empiri-
cal legal studies to their practices; (vi) much of its focus is on quite specific problems
within or across sub-disciplines. NLR makes few general theoretical claims.40
If this is a fair interpretation of NLR to date (and as it is presented in this volume),
it is quite compatible with the argument of this chapter.
C. Legal Realism as Jurisprudence
8. R/realism needs to be recognized as contributing to general and particular
jurisprudence, but not as advancing a distinctive theory or conception of law.
Many sociolegal scholars are skeptical of the value or relevance to their work of
analytical legal philosophy and much other mainstream jurisprudence. As it is
currently practiced, there is some merit in this view, especially in respect to some
of the more abstract kinds of philosophizing. Some draw on social theorists, many of
whom were not specifically interested in law. Some spurn explicit theorizing. It is
part of the thesis of this paper that if empirical legal studies are to become more
central within the discipline of law, jurisprudence needs to be taken seriously by
sociolegal scholars, for doctrinal legal theory marginalizes their activities.
NLR does not claim to produce a distinctive jurisprudence, but Brian Tamanaha
(2013) has suggested one way of drawing together various strands, including NLR,
into “sociolegal theory” as a “Third Pillar” of jurisprudence.41 I am sympathetic to
about ALR as an historical phenomenon (see above Thesis 5). In one sense it may be seen as
continuing the unfinished agenda of “scientific” ALR, but its goals are broader than that.
40 One exception is that “New Legal Realists in the U.S. have been working towards a new synthesis of
law, social science and policy since 1997” (“New Legal RealismConversations: An Empirical Law and
Society Blog” 2011). That sounds like an ambitious theoretical agenda along somewhat different lines
from what is suggested here. My impression is that to date NLR has had more concrete aims.
41 Tamanaha rightly suggests that background assumptions or orientations do not on their own constitute
a theory of law (Tamanaha 2013). He argues that there is a broad tradition of theorizing about “law and
society” out of which a general socio legal theory can be developed with a distinct name and identity
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the thrust of his argument, and I agree that historically positivism, natural law, and
social-theoretical approaches have been perceived as rivals. However, I suggest that
the most useful interpretation of realism, and more broadly of social-legal theory,
should be restricted to some clear central theoretical claims or propositions, without
adopting any particular conception or theory of law.42 There are two main reasons
for this: first, adopting such a theory or conception of law would be unnecessarily
restrictive – a realist approach opens the door to the whole range of social theories
and perspectives. The concept of law should not be expected to do much work.
Second, and more important, realism and social-legal theory, as interpreted here,
should not be seen as rivaling or merely complementing other strands in legal
theorizing, but should rather claim that they are an integral part of understanding
law and so of the discipline of law. This involves denying sharp divisions between
theoretical schools or traditions. The central claim of realism relates to focus, not
epistemology or methodology or ideology: any theory or general theoretical
approach that neglects or excludes the empirical dimensions of our discipline is
deficient. Nevertheless, too much is conceded to narrow visions of jurisprudence or
legal philosophy unless one takes the theoretical aspects of realism seriously.
The main concerns behind realism, including NLR, relate to what academic
lawyers do, or should be doing, in their roles as scholars and teachers.43 Given this
primary focus, it has not been a priority to contribute to the more abstract levels of
legal theorizing.44
9. R/realist claims can be expressed in weak, moderate, or strong terms and can be
elaborated in more or less detail. Here one proposition will suffice: knowledge
that can concretize it as a focus of attention. He leaves open whether this should be treated as a
contribution to abstract legal philosophy or just as a distinctive strand/tradition and branch of
jurisprudence. Hanoch Dagan has developed a sophisticated, new “Realist” synthesizing “theory of
law” based on some classic ALR texts (Dagan 2013b). I find it very illuminating, but it looks like a new
Dagan theory inspired, inter alia, by ALR, rather than just a rational reconstruction. Although claiming
to be transnational and not confined to adjudication, in its present form it has an American bias and
devotes a lot of attention to appellate judicial decisions and reasoning on questions of law. It is also
constrained by a felt need to be true to the classic texts, at least in spirit. If Dagan’s theory of law broke
free from such constraints, it is quite close in spirit to this paper. However, Dagan sees such a distinct
synthesizing theory as a necessary foundation for a “realist” approach. I differ. By limiting my
interpretation of “realism” to a single proposition that is compatible with many such theories of law,
but incompatible with exclusive doctrinal theories, my intention is to suggest that accepting the
hedgehog thesis involves no necessary commitment to particular positions in the canon of jurispru-
dence or social theory; but it does rule out exclusivist doctrinal theories, which at present represent the
bulk of legal theorizing.
42 Cf. MacCormick (2007, 300) (claiming that his institutional theory fits better with empirical under-
standings than most rival theories and that some conceptual claims are not refuted merely by a lack of
fit with empirical evidence). I am grateful to David Restrepo-Amariles for this point. Hanoch Dagan
argues strongly against a positivist interpretation of R/realism (Dagan 2013b). Of course, much depends
on how “positivism” is used in this context. On indicators and league tables requiring a working is/
ought distinction, see below note 65.
43 On particularism, see below note 60 and accompanying text and references.
44 On whether most American Realists were “positivists” see above note 38.
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and understanding of the empirical dimensions of law and justice are relevant to/
part of (weak), an integral part of understanding legal phenomena (moderate),
necessary/essential (strong) to the enterprise of understanding law and legal
phenomena.
General “realist” claims can be roughly designated as weak, moderate, or strong, but
there is room for differences about such labeling. For example, in my view it is weak
to say that Salmond was incomplete; it is moderate to say, in the context of my legal
education, that it was misleading; it is strong to say his treatment of negligence was
invalid, or false, or an example of academic malpractice. Similarly, to say that some
legal rules are indeterminate is weak; to say that legal rules generally need to be
interpreted in context, or that for most scholarly and practical purposes knowledge of
legal rules or legal doctrine is not enough, is moderate; to say that “talk of rules is a
myth” or that all rules are indeterminate is strong.45
(a) Even weak versions of this proposition can play a useful role. For it is sufficient
to challenge any theory or perspective that implicitly or explicitly denies it.
For example, it challenges the idea that it is possible to divine the nature or essence
of law solely by conceptual analysis, as some analytical jurists suggest (e.g., Raz 2005,
324; discussed by Dworkin 2006b, ch. 8; Raz 2009, 104–105; discussed by Tamanaha
2013; cf. Shapiro 2011).46 Similarly, it challenges even weak versions of Dworkin’s
interpretations of “the sociological concept,” let alone the silly suggestion that
sociolegal perspectives are neither philosophically interesting nor practically impor-
tant. Indeed, it challenges all strong forms of doctrinal theorizing about law.
(b) Moderate versions of realism can add some specificity to realist theoretical
claims even at this general level.
Some of these have been touched on already. For example:
(i) For most purposes the study of doctrine alone is not enough;47 for example,
the claim that one cannot understand the law of negligence or personal
injuries in England or the United States without taking into account
insurance, settlement out of court, the vanishing trial, and the damages
45 See below page 137.
46 One does not even have to subscribe to Leiter’s strong (replacement) or a weak version of naturalism to
deny the possibility or, if possible, the value of such quests (Leiter 2007, ch.1). This debate is primarily a
philosophical one. My position is that, whether or not it is feasible to pursue abstract conceptual
analysis without regard to social facts, this kind of philosophy is not very helpful to those pursuing
empirical enquiries about law at lower levels of abstraction.
47 A standard elaboration of this proposition points out that legal rules are not self-enacting, self-
interpreting, self-applying, self-invoking, or self-legitimating (GJP, 299–301). They need to be studied
“in context” – what context is appropriate itself depends on the context of enquiry. Even a single,
discrete rule is nearly always part of a complex of understandings, which may include not only other
rules and rules about rules, but also other factors. Galligan’s conception of “social spheres” usefully
captures one central idea (Galligan 2007, ch.6; cf. GJP, 298–301, 320–321). What is enough depends on
context. Of course, scholarly enquiry is in one sense never complete.
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lottery.48 A purely doctrinal treatment is not only incomplete; in some contexts
it will also bemisleading. Legal doctrine needs to be studied and interpreted in
context. Conversely, an account of extra-judicial settlements of personal inju-
ries claims normally presupposes an accurate account of relevant doctrine.
(ii) Many enquiries about legal phenomena at whatever level of abstraction
involve a combination of conceptual, normative, and empirical strands.
For most scholarly and theoretical purposes, conceptual, normative, and
empirical enquiries are interdependent, but there is room for differences
and disagreements about emphasis in particular contexts.49
(iii) As was argued above, realism as an approach and as part of jurisprudence
cannot be sensibly confined to being realistic about adjudication, let alone
decision making by superior common law courts.50
(iv) A prime target of moderate legal realism is the use of the term “legal reason-
ing” to apply it only to reasoning about questions of law, and the practice of
neglecting all other kinds of reasonings in legal contexts (such as reasoning
from evidence in court, evidence-based policy and law making, reasoning in
sentencing, and reasoning in negotiation) and the relations between them
(RE, ch.10).51 This usage is an egregious and impoverishing example of the
gravitational pull of doctrine.
48 A realist approach often involves the reclassification of a topic or organizing category, e.g., Patrick
Atiyah’s substitution of compensation for accidents for negligence (Atiyah 1970). On “fact-based
classification” see Jolowicz (1970).
49 This does not involve commitment to claims that empirical information is always relevant to con-
ceptual analysis or normative judgments. I am somewhat sympathetic to the view that: “We cannot
certify the truth of our value judgments through physical or biological or metaphysical discoveries. We
must make a case, not supply evidence, for our convictions” (Dworkin 2011, 418). I would insert “only”
before supply (and see note 55 above). Also see discussions of evidence-based policy, challenging the
view that empirical evidence can ever be enough. E.g., Black (2001): “Evidence-based policy” grew
belatedly from evidence-based medicine. See the website of the group The Coalition for Evidence-
Based Policy, www.coalition4evidence.org, and especially http://coalition4evidence.org/1399–2/
national-academy-of-sciences-report/. In the U.K., see Solesbury (2001). See also Russell and
Greenhalgh (2011), and Cartwright and Stegenga (2011).
50 See above note 22.
51 Another ladder of abstraction illustrates the point: questions about rationality, reasoning in general
(logic in a broad sense), and practical reasoning in general are principally philosophical questions;
questions about reasoning in legal contexts, reasoning at all stages of litigation, and reasoning about
questions of law in appellate courts are abstract jurisprudential questions that require both philoso-
phical and legal knowledge (including some knowledge of different legal traditions at this level of
generality); questions about reasoning in hard cases in common law jurisdictions or in American
appellate courts in a specified period or the U.S. SupremeCourt in a specified period, down to analysis
of the reasoning in a single judicial opinion in the United States or elsewhere, all need significant
amounts of local legal knowledge. Only questions of law are regularly treated by doctrinal legal
philosophers and jurists under the loose rubric of “legal reasoning,” often moving freely among levels
of abstraction. Interestingly, some of the more abstract aspects of reasoning in legal contexts, for
example the probabilities debates in regard to proof, are particularly philosophically interesting (RE,
126–131, 332–334; Roberts and Zuckerman 2010, 116–132). Quite often in the literature on “legal
reasoning” the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is treated as if it is
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(v) Although analytical positivists like Hart have adopted social-fact conceptions
of law, they have tended to draw back from taking social facts seriously (GJP,
58–60; Lacey 2006, 2013). Analytical jurists have not devoted much attention
to socio legal concepts such as function, fact, dispute, process, institution,
and even judge, lawyer, and court, even though describing, interpreting,
comparing, generalizing about, and explaining legal phenomena are as
much in need of adequate concepts as legal doctrine and its presuppositions
(GJB, ch. 2; Twining 2005).52 I have argued elsewhere that there is plenty of
work for conceptual elucidation across the doctrinal/empirical divide, espe-
cially in relation to empirical comparative legal studies/comparative law
(GJP, ch. 2 and 8).
(vi) Amartya Sen’s approach to justice and injustice (Sen 2009) can be inter-
preted as an example of moderate realism. His complaint against a tradition
of philosophizing and economic theory (“transcendental institutionalism” –
exemplified by Rawls’ theory of justice) is that it is too abstract and removed
from what actually happens to be of practical use.53 Sen’s plea is for being
“constantly sensitive to what actually happens in the world” (Sen 2009, 85).
The objection is not that transcendental theory is valueless or uninteresting,
but rather that too much philosophical effort has been diverted from making
useful contributions to pressing real-world actual problems that are soluble.
Put crudely, from a practical point of view, ideal theory is neither necessary
nor helpful (Sen 2009, 24–27). Sen clearly is a “realist” in the present context,
and many realists will be attracted by the spirit of his approach, but accep-
tance of the core idea of realism does not necessarily commit a legal realist to
prefer Sen’s theory of justice to that of Rawls.
My thesis is that moderate versions of realism, as interpreted here, are compatible
with moderate versions of natural law, or analytical positivism,54 or a Dworkinian
unproblematic. This obscures the relationship between reasoning from evidence and reasoning about
questions of law, and the similarities and differences between them – for example, the role of stories in
the two overlapping types of argumentation not only in adjudication, but in decision making in other
kinds of legal context.
52 Besides elucidation, conceptual analysis can help in disambiguating, deconstructing, constructing,
refining, and inventing usable concepts, not least in regard to concepts that can transcend legal
traditions and cultures. On the emics/etics debate in anthropology (Headland, Pike, and Harris
1990) and its significance for jurisprudence and comparative law, seeGJP (n. 41, n. 63, n. 48, and n. 98).
53 The crux of his thesis is summed up as follows: “There are . . . good evidential reasons to think that
none of these grand institutional formulae typically deliver what their visionary advocates hope, and
their actual success in generating good social realizations is thoroughly contingent on varying social,
economic, political and cultural circumstances” (Sen 2009, 83). And see the more general debate,
stimulated by thinkers like BernardWilliams (1985) and RaymondGeuss (2001), concerning an alleged
lack of realism in much recent political philosophy in Hall (2013); Floyd and Stears (2011).
54 A realist can agree that describing, comparing, generalizing about, and explaining legal phenomena
often raise difficult issues of conceptualization, that these activities need serviceable concepts, and that
rigorous conceptual analysis can help in constructing and refining such concepts (GJP, ch. 2).
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view of public morality,55 or idealistic views of human rights or expositions of
doctrine that are sensitive to context. No doubt some of these moderate claims
will be considered controversial.
(c) Strong claims
Strong claims for realism are likely to be controversial just because they do, or seem
to, challenge strongly entrenched positions. Some extreme claims for realism can be
shown to be false or so overstated as not to be worth defending, but others can be
interpreted to be interesting and worth debating.
Let us take two standard examples of “extreme” views attributed to R/realism: first,
“Realists advance a prediction theory of law.” This is a loose attribution that is
generally discredited. It is widely accepted that such a theory is easily criticized on
several grounds and thatHart did a good job of demolishing it (Hart 1961, 10–12, 86–88,
133–135). The main criticism of Hart in this respect turns on whether any ALR can be
charitably interpreted as seriously advancing such a theory. On the other hand, it is
also widely acknowledged that one of themain tasks of several kinds of legal actors is to
predict various kinds of decisions and other outcomes, and that doctrine can be one
aid, but not the sole one, for making such predictions from certain standpoints.
Realists made a contribution by emphasizing that predicting is one thing that legal
actors do, but that is not a theory of law. Such a moderate interpretation leaves only a
little room for worthwhile controversy, but plenty of room for refinement.
Second, the Realists believed in “rule-scepticism or the claim that talk of rules is a
myth” (Hart 1961, 133). There is a fairly wide acceptance that no Realist ever made
such a claim, but that by distinguishing the concepts of rule from command, habit,
and prediction Hart destroyed the idea. The original statement is ambiguous, but if
in the present context we interpret it to be a denial that rules exist as social facts, it
may be worth revisiting the debate.
The caricature of ALR that Hart attacked might still be defensible philosophi-
cally.56 If we turn to the general theory of norms, the position is more controversial
55 For example, a Dworkinian can acknowledge that actual consequences may sometimes be relevant to
making the rightmoral decision. AmoderateDworkinian can acknowledge that empirical legal studies
have a role to play in the discipline of law, though not necessarily in respect of narrowly posed issues
about the relationship between legal and moral propositions. I leave to one side the general issue
whether all theorizing necessarily involves empirical assumptions.
56 In 1977, Ronald Dworkin corrected a statement that he had made in an earlier article as follows: “My
point was not that ‘the law’ contains a fixed number of standards some of which are rules and others
principles. I want to oppose the idea that ‘the law’ is a fixed set of standards of any sort. My point was
rather that an accurate summary of the considerations lawyers must take into account, in deciding
particular issues of rights and duties, would include propositions having the form and force of
principles, and that judges and lawyers themselves in justifying their conclusions, often use proposi-
tions which must be understood in this way” (Dworkin 1977, 76; reaffirmed Dworkin 2013b, 234, 264 n.
6). I shall not consider here whether this makes Dworkin a “rule-skeptic” (rules play a modest role in
his theory), but it is clearly a rejection of positivist views that propositions of law can be separated
conceptually from their justifications. I am indebted to Andrew Halpin for this point. Some strong
versions of radical indeterminacy in respect of rules may be interpreted as a denial of their existence.
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than some jurists might expect. There is no uniformity of usage across disciplines of
“norm,” “rule,” or “social norm” in normative theory (Twining 2011a, 479–485). Nor
is there any settled way of classifying them. There are serious problems about
individuation of norms and of normative orders. There is no consensus on the
question: “under what conditions is it true to say that a rule exists?”57 There is still
no consensus within jurisprudence as to this question in relation to legal rules. Jurists
have tended to skirt these questions (Joseph Raz (1990; 1992, 70–92) is a notable
exception), concentrating on “the legal” in “legal rules” or treating them as a species
of institutional facts (e.g., MacCormick 2007) or fictitious entities (e.g., Bentham’s
theory of fictions, discussed by Quinn 2015; Schofield 2006). None of these puzzles
has stopped several self-proclaimed “realists” from writing whole books about rules
(e.g., Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (ed. Schauer 2011); Schauer, Playing by the
Rules (1991); Twining and Miers, How To Do Things with Rules ([1973]2010)) or
making or criticizing legislation, or arguing that certain rule-statements are inaccu-
rate, false, or debatable. It is almost impossible for a jurist or social scientist to do
without the language of rules.
Let us consider another example of strong realism. Underhill Moore raised the
question: can there be a general empirical science of law? (e.g., Moore and
Callaghan 1943).58 What exactly the question means needs clarification. Moore’s
answer was based on crude versions of behaviorism and “science” current at the time
and has generally been dismissed. His parking studies, carried out amateurishly and
based on a contested version of “learning theory,” were ridiculed and generally
ignored. (Schlegel 1995, ch. 3 is a fairly sympathetic assessment.) But the idea that
how human beings interact with and respond to rules is an important line of enquiry
as part of a general empirical science of law. The idea is again topical in the light of
“globalization” (GJP, ch. 8.9). Moore’s basic question could be interpreted to mean:
can empirical enquiries produce (some) explanatory, falsifiable, evidence-based,
predictive, cumulative hypotheses and generalizations about legal phenomena in
the world as a whole that are comparable in rigor to some findings of hard behavioral
or physical sciences? Is such a “science” feasible? Is it desirable? In my view, we have
hardly started to pose such questions, let alone tried to answer them (GJP,
258–262).59 Both the questions and the answers are contestable and deserve the
attention of legal theorists.
57 My own view is that is useful, indeed often necessary, to talk as if rules exist as social facts (but social
facts are themselves constructs) – and that it makes sense to treat legal rules as institutional facts.
However, I do not pursue that hare here.
58 Cook (1927) discussed a similar question from a different standpoint (KLRM, 36–40).
59 In my view, the main lessons of ALR in this respect are that Underhill Moore and others took the
analogy with the physical sciences too literally and they radically underestimated the enormity of the
enterprise of developing a new science (see also KLRM, 188–196). Llewellyn, whose views on this seem
to me to be eminently sensible for the time, asserted that the social sciences generally were at a “pre-
pre-science stage” (Llewellyn 1941, 13; discussed KLRM, 191–192). On justified and unjustified resis-
tance to “scientism,” see GJP, ch. 16.4 at www.cambridge.org/twining.
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C. Implications of “Globalization”
10. Globalization and transnationalization present major challenges to legal
realism, not least in respect of developing evidence-based generalizations
about law throughout the world or substantial parts of it.
Academic law, especially doctrinal studies, like most of our heritage of legal theory
has in the past been almost exclusively concerned with the municipal law of
sovereign states treated as self-contained units. Transnationalization, regionalism,
and so-called globalization are rapidly changing the agendas for our discipline and
for legal theory. We have to concern ourselves with a much wider range of legal
forms – at transnational, regional, supranational, and even global levels. Fields such
as comparative law, new forms of international law, internet law, and new forms of
domination and imperialism now demand attention of legal scholars and jurists. So
do concepts such as nonstate law, soft law, normative and legal pluralism, diffusion,
and terrorism. The legacy of ALR and other “realisms” is almost certainly inade-
quate to deal with many such issues. NLR is taking up the challenge.
Joseph Raz, in a passage quoted by Tamanaha acknowledges that sociology of
law,60 “provides a wealth of detailed information and analysis about the functions of
law in some particular societies” (Raz 2009, 104–105; Tamanaha, 2013). Raz suggests
that this is irrelevant to legal philosophy, which “has to be content with those few
features which all legal systems necessarily possess” (Raz 2009, 105). This is a fair
acknowledgement of the main past achievements of empirical legal studies, and it
correctly emphasizes the tendency towards particularism of such approaches: just as
doctrinal studies have historically focused almost entirely on the municipal legal
systems of particular modern nation states, similarly empirical legal studies have
focused primarily on large and small “societies” treated as self-contained units.
However, Raz’s statement is out of date on this in one important respect. In the
last twenty years or so, both doctrinal and empirical legal studies have broadened out
geographically, perhaps largely in response to so-called globalization. Transnational
and comparative empirical legal studies are coming into their own (GJP, passim,
esp. 234–258).61 As a result, we are at a very early stage in developing the capacity to
take on big theoretical issues and bold empirical hypotheses from a genuinely global
perspective.62 For example, are we ready to tackle such questions as:
60 A charitable interpretation treats “sociology of law” here to cover empirical legal studies generally
including macro- (e.g., Glenn 2007) and micro- legal history (e.g., Hurst 1964). Raz and I differ on the
scope and value of philosophy of law.
61 A significant recent development is the series on Legalism, published by Oxford University Press. This
series promises to provide concepts and hypotheses that could greatly advance the empirical side of
comparative law. The first volume, Paul Dresch and Hannah Skoda (eds.) Legalism: Anthropology and
History, was published in 2012.
62 Because of the traditional focus on local municipal law “[a]t this stage in history we are not yet very
well-equipped to provide an over-arching Grand Theory or even many reliable generalisations about
the hugely complex phenomena of law in the world as a whole: as yet we lack concepts, data,
hypotheses and models adequate for the task. Our Western academic heritage provides some
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To what extent and under what conditions is law context- and culture-specific?63
Can there be a general scientific empirical theory of legal phenomena in the world
as a whole? (GJP, ch. 11).
What role does law play in advancing or constraining sustainable economic and
social development?
These are examples of the kind of challenges that confront jurisprudence when one
adopts a global perspective. As the next volume will be devoted to NLR and
globalization, it would be premature to comment in detail here, except to empha-
size that extensive conceptual, normative, and empirical work will be necessary to
de-parochialize some aspects of realistic approaches.64
Indicators and rankings: An even newer “realism”?
We live in audit societies and an increasingly, often dubiously, audited world,
including more or less crass league tables based on dubious comparators (Power
1997; GLT, ch. 6). Assessing how far reality falls short of aspiration and suggesting
ways to close the gap in respect of democratic deficit, respect for human rights,
promising starting points on which to build, but the challenges are enormous. The message is anti-
reductionist: it emphasises the complexity of legal phenomena and warns against simplistic, exagger-
ated, false, meaningless, superficial, and ethnocentric generalisations about law in the world as whole
[or large parts of it]” (GLS, 18–19).
63 Cf. Bentham’s typically acute formulation in an early work: “To give the question at once universal
form, what is the influence of the circumstances of place and time in matters of legislation? What are
the coincidences and what the diversities that ought to subsist between laws established in different
countries and at different periods, supposing them in each instance the best to be established?”
(Bentham,“ Place and Time” (1780), in Engelmann 2011, 152–219; discussed GLS, 59–67; also cf.
Tamanaha 2013, 6.).
64 On NLR treatments of globalization see above note 29. I have written extensively about the implica-
tions of “globalization” for the discipline of law (see especially GLT; GJP; and GLS). As a starting
point it is worth bearing inmind some standard warnings: (i) do not restrict “globalization” to processes
and phenomena that are genuinely world-wide: most significant transnational patterns in relation to
law are sub-global; (ii) do not overuse such terms as “global law,” “global lawyers,” “global solutions,”
“global values”; (iii) taking “globalization” seriously challenges somemainstream general assumptions
underlying Western traditions of academic law: it is not a great exaggeration to say that adopting a
genuinely global perspective suggests that our academic cultures have tended to be state-oriented,
secular, positivist, “top-down,” Northocentric, ignorant of other traditions, unempirical, and univers-
alist in respect of morals. To date empirical legal studies may have been less vulnerable to some of
these charges than orthodox doctrinal approaches (e.g., in regard to pluralism, nonstate law, and
empiricism), but insofar as they have been largely focused on “societies” treated as if they are self-
enclosed units a good deal of rethinking and adjustment is needed. Anthropologists have moved away
from this practice, mainly since a seminal conference at Bellagio in 1986, where they rediscovered
history and geography (see GJP 42–43 and Starr and Collier 1989); (iv) “globalization” should not be
thought of as a threat to detailed, particular, practical, and scholarly legal studies. In GLS I have
suggested an approach for individual scholars and teachers to ask in an open-ended way: what are the
implications of “globalization” for my specialism, my course, my research project? For many indivi-
duals a reasonable answermay be: “notmuch.” After all, most legal studies are rightly oriented to local,
practical, particular problems.
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attraction of foreign investment, social protection and employment, business reg-
ulation, corruption, and the rule of law is now a major and rapidly expanding
industry. “Indicators” articulating normative standards in respect of official laws,
enforcement, efficacy and efficiency, impact, and so forth have been developed with
increasing sophistication,65 amid considerable controversy, at national, regional,66
transnational, and global levels (Davis, Kingsbury, andMerry 2012; duMarais 2006).
They include the Millennium Development Goals, the Rule of Law Index, Doing
Business Indicators, European Union indicators in the framework of the Open
Method of Coordination, United Nations Rule of Law Indicators, and the World
Bank’s World Governance Indicators, as well as human rights conventions and
declarations. All of these require a working distinction between aspiration (ought)
and reality (is) – with “reality” operating at various levels (see GJP, 251–258, 296–301,
348–355 – now partly outdated – and Restrepo-Amariles, forthcoming). So far, apart
from a few enclaves in respect of human rights and development programs (Davis,
Kingsbury, and Merry 2012) academic lawyers have focused almost entirely on
relatively sophisticated (though self-interested) critiques of law school league tables
(GLT, 161–165, GJP 254–255). The general phenomenon of indicators and rankings
is one of the principal current challenges to academic law, including jurisprudence.
Adequate critique and, where appropriate, development require normative, con-
ceptual, and empirical inputs. To what extent do current ones measure acceptable
aspirations, let alone realities, of the law in action? One reason why jurisprudence
should be interested in indicators is to understand the extent to which legal phe-
nomena and the discipline of law may be under pressure because of these
phenomena.
conclusion
Legal realism needs to be integrated into mainstream jurisprudence. Insofar as
doctrinal legal theory excludes or marginalizes empirical dimensions of law and
justice, it impoverishes the enterprise of understanding law.
65 “Indicators reflect the evolution of social science research in which not only we have more data
(empirically collected) but also a more sophisticated use of it (through the use of econometrics,
mathematics, statistical methods, etc.). There is thus an important difference from classic statistics in
the sense of collection of empirical data about the number of judges, with contemporary indicators,
which provide a more complex view of phenomena at different levels: classification of phenomena,
quantification, mathematization, etc.” (David Restrepo-Amariles, private communication to author,
September 2013). I am grateful to him for help with the whole of this paragraph.
66 On the regional level, “Indicators are a key component of the Open Method of Coordination of the
European Union. Here indicators are clearly used to design and assess regulatory standards in areas
such as education, social protection, employment, etc. . . . in areas where the European Union has no
law-making competence” (David Restrepo-Amariles, communication to author, September 2013).
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